FIFA Transfer Regulations and UEFA Player Eligibility Rules: Major Changes in European Football and the Negative Effect on Minors by Lembo, Christina
Emory International Law Review 
Volume 25 Issue 1 
2011 
FIFA Transfer Regulations and UEFA Player Eligibility Rules: Major 
Changes in European Football and the Negative Effect on Minors 
Christina Lembo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr 
Recommended Citation 
Christina Lembo, FIFA Transfer Regulations and UEFA Player Eligibility Rules: Major Changes in European 
Football and the Negative Effect on Minors, 25 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 539 (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol25/iss1/12 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
LEMBO GALLEYSFINAL 6/28/2011 10:46 AM 
 
FIFA TRANSFER REGULATIONS AND UEFA PLAYER 
ELIGIBILITY RULES: MAJOR CHANGES IN EUROPEAN 
FOOTBALL AND THE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON MINORS 
Behind the European love affair with football1—the packed stadiums, the 
rowdy fans, the time off from work to watch important matches—lies a 
significant dilemma: on one hand, fans want their teams to play at the highest 
competitive level, but on the other, they care about the backgrounds and 
nationality of the players on their locally-based teams.2 This dilemma has led 
to the promulgation of various transfer regulations by the governing bodies of 
international football that control a player’s ability to transfer to a foreign 
team.3 The changing of these transfer regulations over time, however, has had 
a negative impact on many minors4 who play football. In particular, European 
football clubs have exploited various loopholes in the transfer regulations to 
recruit young foreign players and retain young local players.5 Some of these 
measures include creating jobs for the children’s parents so they can legally 
move to Europe,6 entering into contracts with minors at a young age,7 and 
using loopholes found in immigration laws throughout the European Union 
(“EU”).8 In the worst cases, unlicensed agents are trafficking minors from 
Africa to Europe.9 This Comment looks at the evolution of the regulations 
governing player mobility and its impact on minors. 
The modern saga of who can play on which team began with the Bosman 
case,10 the seminal case that deals with transfer regulations in European 
football. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) decided the case in 1995.11 
Bosman created free transferability for players with expired contracts and 
 
 1 In this Comment, the term “football” refers to American soccer. 
 2 See Srikanth Iyer, It’s All About Nationality, ISPORT (Aug. 10, 2009, 11:43 PM), http://www.isport.in/ 
european-football/its-all-about-nationality-654. 
 3 See infra Part III. 
 4 In this Comment, the term “minor” refers to persons under the age of eighteen. 
 5 See infra Part IV. 
 6 See infra Part IV. 
 7 See infra Part IV. 
 8 See infra Part V.A. 
 9 See infra Part V.B. 
 10 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-
5040. 
 11 Id. 
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opened the door for the recruitment of foreign players12—including teenagers 
and even children. The ECJ based its decision on a fundamental right under the 
laws of the EU: the freedom of movement for workers between countries 
within the EU.13 After the Bosman case, Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (“FIFA”),14 the organization governing world football, 
promulgated new transfer regulations, and the Union of European Football 
Associations (“UEFA”),15 the continental confederation that sits under FIFA 
and governs European football, promulgated new player eligibility 
restrictions.16 Unfortunately, these regulations did not resolve all the issues 
presented in Bosman, and in turn, created even greater issues in relation to 
minor football players. In an effort to create greater protection for minors, 
FIFA promulgated new regulations in October 2009.17 Although the effects of 
these regulations have yet to be seen, many strategies that clubs employ to 
obtain young players are outside the scope of FIFA’s control, and these 
problems need to be evaluated and fixed on a European and international scale. 
This Comment explores the problems and proposes solutions for FIFA and 
UEFA, the EU, and other international and independent organizations. 
Part I gives a general overview of the organizations that govern 
international and European football and the EU institutions that play a role in 
European football. Part II discusses the history of football transfer regulations, 
with a particular focus on the ECJ’s ruling in the Bosman case. Part III 
explains the FIFA transfer regulations created after the Bosman case in 2001, 
FIFA’s amended transfer regulations of 2005, and UEFA’s player eligibility 
rules. Part IV discusses the football clubs’ reactions to these rules and their 
efforts to recruit and sign young talent. Part V analyzes the legal problems that 
result from the clubs’ actions within the framework of European and 
international law. Part VI discusses FIFA’s attempt to fix these problems with 
the 2009 transfer regulations, and points out potential problems. Finally, Part 
VII suggests solutions to the problems that should be implemented by FIFA 
and UEFA, the EU, and other international and independent organizations. 
 
 12 See infra Part II.C. 
 13 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5068, I-5071. 
 14 For a more detailed description, see infra Part I.A. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See infra Part III.D. 
 17 FIFA, REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (2009) [hereinafter FIFA RSTP 
(2009)], available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/66/98/97/ 
regulationsstatusandtransfer_en_1210.pdf. 
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING EUROPEAN FOOTBALL 
This Part gives a general overview of the three main powers that influence 
the transfer regulations in European football: FIFA, UEFA, and the EU 
institutions. One main problem with the football transfer regulations results 
from the fact that the FIFA and UEFA regulations conflict with laws of the 
EU.18 Additionally, individual countries within the EU have different laws that 
FIFA and UEFA must take into account, which is discussed further in Part V. 
A. Governing Organizations of International and European Football: FIFA 
and UEFA 
The structure of international football is hierarchical.19 FIFA, the governing 
organization of international football, sits at the top of the hierarchy.20 FIFA 
was created in 1904 under Swiss law to create an international structure for 
football.21 FIFA commits itself to constantly improving the sport.22 The FIFA 
Statutes form the overarching document guiding FIFA’s governing system.23 
The governing system is divided into separate bodies that have the appropriate 
powers to create a system of checks and balances.24 It consists of four general 
bodies:25 the Congress,26 the Executive Committee,27 the general secretariat,28 
and standing and ad-hoc committees.29 For the purposes of this Comment it is 
important to note that the Executive Committee “regulate[s] the status of 
[p]layers and the provisions for their transfer,”30 and that the Players’ Status 
 
 18 See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5040. 
 19 Lindsey J. Meân, Making Masculinity and Framing Femininity: FIFA, Soccer, and World Cup 
Websites, in EXAMINING IDENTITY IN SPORTS MEDIA 65, 66 (Heather L. Hundley & Andrew C. Billings eds., 
2010). 
 20 Id. 
 21 The Federation, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/index.html (last visited Jan. 28, 
2011). 
 22 FRANS DE WEGER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FIFA DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAMBER 1 (2008). 
 23 FIFA, FIFA STATUTES: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES STANDING 
ORDERS OF THE CONGRESS (2009) [hereinafter FIFA STATUTES], available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/ 
document/affederation/federation/01/24/fifastatuten2009_e.pdf. 
 24 Id. art. 21. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Under the FIFA Statutes, “Congress is the supreme and legislative body.” Id. art. 21(1). 
 27 The Executive Committee “is the executive body.” Id. art. 21(2). It “consists of 24 members: 1 
President elected by Congress, 8 vice-presidents, and 15 members, appointed by the Confederations and 
[National] Associations.” Id. art. 30(1). 
 28 The general secretariat acts as “the administrative body.” Id. art. 21(3). 
 29 The standing and ad hoc committees “advise and assist the Executive Committee in fulfilling its 
duties.” Id. art. 21(4). 
 30 Id. art. 5. 
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Committee is the standing committee that is responsible for monitoring 
compliance with the transfer regulations.31 
Below FIFA sit six confederations that are divided roughly by continent, 
which create the next level of the hierarchy.32 Each continental confederation 
has a governing body similar to FIFA’s and can create separate rules and 
regulations so long as they are not in conflict with FIFA’s rules and 
regulations.33 These continental confederations oversee the national 
associations, which are assigned to a confederation based on continent.34 The 
national associations can also create separate rules and regulations so long as 
they are not in conflict with the corresponding confederation’s rules or FIFA’s 
rules.35 As of the writing of this Comment, 208 national football associations 
are members of FIFA.36 Each national association oversees all the individual 
clubs, which are separated into divisions based on their level of competition.37 
Finally, the individual players are divided among all the clubs.38 
UEFA is one of the six confederations under FIFA and one of the largest in 
terms of strength and wealth.39 As of 2011, UEFA oversees fifty-three national 
football associations.40 UEFA administers football games through the national 
associations and through its own competitions.41 UEFA has a governing 
structure similar to FIFA’s that consists of four “organs” that UEFA may act 
through.42 These organs are the Congress,43 the Executive Committee,44 the 
 
 31 Id. art. 49. 
 32 These continental confederations include: Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (“CONMEBOL”), 
Asian Football Confederation (“AFC”), Union des Associations Européennes de Football (“UEFA”), 
Confédération Africaine de Football (“CAF”), Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean 
Association Football (“CONCACAF”), and Oceania Football Confederation (“OFC”). Id. art. 20(1). 
 33 See id. art. 20(3)–(5). 
 34 FIFA may give confederations authority to grant membership to a national association that is not 
geographically located within its continent. Id. art. 20(2). 
 35 See id. arts. 12–13 (explaining Members’ rights and duties in relation to FIFA).  
 36 FIFA’s Member Associations, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/associations.html 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
 37 See, e.g., JOSÉ LUIS ARNAUT, INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN SPORT REVIEW 57 (2006). 
 38 Id. 
 39 UEFA, ECONOMICEXPERT.COM, http://www.economicexpert.com/a/UEFA.html (last visited Jan. 28, 
2011); UEFA, SOLAR NAVIGATOR, http://www.solarnavigator.net/sport/UEFA.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
 40 About UEFA, UEFA.COM, http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/index.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
 41 Id. 
 42 UEFA, UEFA STATUTES: RULES OF PROCEDURE OF CONGRESS REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATUTES 12 (2007) [hereinafter UEFA Statues], available at http://www.uefa.com/ 
newsfiles/19081.pdf. 
 43 The Congress is “the supreme controlling Organ of UEFA.” Id. 
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President,45 and the Organs for the Administration of Justice.46 This separation 
of powers guarantees a system of checks and balances similar to FIFA’s.47 
B. European Union Institutions 
The European Union is the product of economic and political regional 
integration.48 As of the writing of this Comment, the EU has twenty-seven 
member states.49 This unionization results in the creation and implementation 
of laws and policies that sit above the national laws and policies of the member 
states.50 The EU has five institutions responsible for governing the European 
Community.51 These institutions are the European Parliament, the European 
Council, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the 
European Court of Auditors.52 The institutions most relevant in the discussion 
of European football are the European Commission (the “Commission”), the 
European Parliament, and the ECJ. 
The Commission is “the executive-bureaucratic arm” of the EU.53 It 
focuses on representing the interests of the EU in its entirety.54 The 
Commission drafts and proposes laws and policies to the European Parliament 
and European Council55—two institutions that often jointly pass EU 
 
 44 The Executive Committee “consist[s] of the President and fifteen other members elected by a 
Congress.” Id. at 16. It has “the power to make decisions on all matters which do not fall within the legal or 
statutory jurisdiction of the Congress or another Organ.” Id. 
 45 For the purposes of this Comment, it is important to note that the President is responsible for relations 
between UEFA and FIFA. Id. at 19. The President also serves as the chair at the Congress and meetings of the 
Executive Committee. Id. at 19 
 46 The “Organs for the Administration of Justice are: the Control and Disciplinary Body; the Appeals 
Body; [and] the Disciplinary Inspector.” Id. at 20. 
 47 ARNAUT, supra note 37, at 58. 
 48 See JOHN MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION 25 (Neill Nugent, William E. 
Patterson & Vincent Wright eds., 2005) (1999) (concluding that the EU is the world’s most evolved example 
of regional integration). 
 49 The 27 Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/27-member-
countries/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
 50 MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 25. 
 51 Institutions of the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/index_en.htm (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
 52 Id. 
 53 MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 82. 
 54 The European Commission, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index_en.htm (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
 55 Id. 
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legislation.56 Once these laws and policies are adopted, the Commission 
oversees their execution.57 
The ECJ is the highest judicial body of the EU.58 Its goal is to ensure that 
the member states of the EU uniformly apply EU legislation.59 The ECJ also 
ensures that national and European laws are consistent with EU treaties.60 The 
ECJ has the power to settle legal disputes between member states, institutions, 
businesses, and individuals.61 The Court’s decisions regarding European sport 
and the free movement of workers in the EU are of particular importance and 
are discussed further throughout this Comment.62 
II. HISTORY OF THE TRANSFER SYSTEM IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL AND THE 
BOSMAN CASE 
This Part first gives an overview of the early transfer regulations used by 
FIFA and UEFA and also describes the problems that the regulations posed for 
players. This Part then focuses on the case of a particular football player, Jean-
Marc Bosman, who fought for his rights through the court systems until the 
ECJ ruled that the transfer regulations violated EU law.63 Specifically, the ECJ 
held that requiring transfer fees for out-of-contract players and establishing 
quotas that limit the number of foreign players on a team violate the 
fundamental right of freedom of movement for EU workers.64 Finally, this Part 
discusses the decision’s immediate effects on the transfer of players in 
European football. 
 
 56 Welcome to the European Parliament, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
parliament/public/staticDisplay.do;jsessionid=A8C681059D7F888873A6DE9332C56FEF.node2?id=146&lan
guage=en (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
 57 MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 82. 
 58 Karen Yvonne Crabbs & Jack J. Coe, Jr., The European Union: An Introduction to Supra-national 
Law in Europe, in I LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE 37, 45 (Christian Campbell ed., 2007). 
 59 The Court of Justice, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 
28, 2011). 
 60 MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 100. 
 61 The Court of Justice, EUROPA, supra note 59. 
 62 See, e.g., infra Part II.B. 
 63 See infra Part II.B. 
 64 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-
5040, I-5073, I-5078. 
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A. Transfer Regulations Before Bosman 
The original FIFA transfer regulations permitted each continental 
confederation to create its own transfer regulations under the broad FIFA 
transfer regulations.65 UEFA took advantage of this right and enforced its own 
transfer regulations for its national associations.66 Two of these regulations 
became topics of dispute. The first regulation gave each player a right to 
transfer to a foreign club when his contract with his then-current club 
expired,67 but required the player’s new club to pay the player’s former club a 
transfer fee.68 UEFA created the transfer fee to compensate the former club for 
the player’s training and development costs.69 In actuality, clubs generally 
required transfer fees that exceeded the cost of a player’s training and 
development.70 This was a great benefit and a source of revenue for the 
player’s former club, and not surprisingly a burden for the new club. 
The second UEFA regulation, colloquially called the “3+2 rule,” required 
national associations to limit the number of foreign players on a club during a 
first division match to three foreign players plus two “assimilated” players.71 
Assimilated players were foreign players who continuously played with a 
national association for five years.72 The assimilated players had to complete 
three of those five years on a junior team.73 
Just as the FIFA regulations permitted each continental confederation to 
establish transfer regulations, UEFA permitted its national associations to 
create their own transfer regulations.74 In accordance with the hierarchy of 
international football, the national association’s transfer regulations must not 
conflict with the FIFA and UEFA transfer regulations.75 FIFA regulations also 
provided that an international transfer could only take place if “the former 
 
 65 Id. at I-5047. 
 66 Amikan Omer Kranz, The Bosman Case: The Relationship Between European Union Law and the 
Transfer System in European Football, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 431, 435 (1999). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See STEFAAN VAN DEN BOGAERT, PRACTICAL REGULATION OF THE MOBILITY OF SPORTSMEN IN THE 
EU POST BOSMAN 210 (2005). 
 71 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-
5040, I-5073, I-5078; Kranz, supra note 66, at 435. 
 72 Kranz, supra note 66, at 435. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See supra Part I.A. 
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national association issued a transfer certificate acknowledging that all 
financial commitments, including any transfer fee, had been settled.”76 
Therefore, a player could not transfer if the national association governing the 
club withheld a transfer certificate. These transfer regulations limited players’ 
career choices and gave the associations and clubs great power over the 
players. 
B. The Bosman Case 
Not surprisingly, players disliked these regulations. One such player, Jean-
Marc Bosman, a Belgian national, took his complaints to the local and national 
courts, and the national court submitted it to the ECJ.77 Bosman played for 
Royal Club Liégois SA (“RC Liège”), a Belgian first division club that was 
subject to the Belgian national association’s transfer regulations.78 Bosman 
received an average monthly salary of 120,000 Belgian francs.79 At the end of 
Bosman’s original contract, RC Liège offered him a one-season contract.80 The 
club, however, reduced his salary to the minimum permitted salary of 30,000 
Belgian francs.81 
Bosman refused RC Liège’s offer and was placed on the compulsory 
transfer list,82 and then entered into the free transfer period.83 During this 
period, US Dunkerque, a French second division club, contacted Bosman and 
offered him a significantly higher salary and a large signing bonus.84 RC Liège 
doubted US Dunkerque’s solvency and ability to pay the transfer fee, however, 
and refused to issue the transfer certificate required by FIFA regulations for 
international transfers.85 Even though US Dunkerque wanted to sign Bosman, 
 
 76 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5047. 
 77 See generally id. 
 78 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5050. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 If an out-of-contract player did not receive or accept a new contract from his former club, he was 
placed on the compulsory transfer list. Id. at I-5045. Other clubs could sign players on this list by paying the 
player’s former club a pre-calculated transfer fee. Id. 
 83 Id. at I-5050. If a player did not join a team by the end of the compulsory transfer period, then he 
entered into a free transfer period. Id. at I-5045. Despite the name, this period did not result in a “free” transfer. 
Rather, the player, his former club, and the new club had to settle on the transfer fee that the new club had to 
pay to the former club. Id. 
 84 US Dunkerque offered Bosman a monthly salary of approximately 100,000 Belgian francs plus a 
signing bonus of approximately 900,000 Belgian francs. Id. at I-5050–51. 
 85 Id. at I-5051. 
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he was ultimately left without a contract for the upcoming season.86 To make 
matters worse, RC Liège suspended Bosman for the entire season.87 
After working its way through the court systems for five years, Bosman’s 
case was heard by the ECJ.88 The ECJ previously established jurisdiction over 
sports-related disputes in Walrave v. Union Cycliste Internationale.89 In 
Walrave, the ECJ determined that sport is subject to European Community 
Law if it is considered “an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 
of the Treaty.”90 Although sport was not explicitly covered in European 
Community Law,91 the ECJ established jurisdiction over cases involving 
certain sports-related disputes by classifying them as an economic activity.92 
Therefore, so long as the sport-related issue is considered an economic activity 
under European Community Law, the ECJ will have jurisdiction to hear the 
case. 
In Bosman, the court upheld its jurisdiction over the case and determined 
that football constitutes an economic activity when the players are gainfully 
employed and receiving remuneration.93 Two questions were presented to the 
ECJ regarding the applicability of particular transfer regulations under EU 
law.94 Both questions were posed in light of the ECJ’s interpretation of Articles 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Kranz, supra note 66, at 436. 
 89 Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405. 
 90 Id. at 1417. In Walrave and in Bosman, the “Treaty” refers to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which 
established the European Economic Community. This treaty was amended and renumbered in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and was renamed the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which entered into force on 
May 1, 1999. As of December 1, 2009, however, the Treaty of Lisbon became the effective treaty, which 
renamed the Treaty Establishing the European Community to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. See Treaties and Law, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
Therefore, the numbering of the articles that the ECJ used in Bosman has changed two times since the decision 
in 1995. This Comment refers to the articles as they are numbered in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Sept. 5, 
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 91 The Treaty of Rome and The Treaty of Amsterdam did not explicitly cover sports. See STEPHEN C. 
SIEBERSON, DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES: THE IMPACT OF THE 
TREATY OF LISBON 235 (2008). Therefore, the ECJ had to gain jurisdiction over sports-related disputes through 
the economic provisions of the European Community Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty, however, sports are 
now mentioned. See TFEU art. 165(1). 
 92 Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. at 1417. 
 93 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-
5040, I-5063. 
 94 Id. at I-5056. 
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45, 101, and 102 of the TFEU.95 The ECJ first applied Article 45 to each 
question.96 Article 45 requires the free movement of workers within the 
European Community.97 Freedom of movement is a right granted to all 
nationals of member states. It permits them to move from their country of 
origin to another member state in pursuit of economic activity.98 Article 45 
also entails “the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between 
workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other 
conditions of work and employment.”99 
The ECJ first addressed whether the transfer regulations were an obstacle 
to free movement of players between clubs in that they permitted clubs to 
collect transfer fees for players who were no longer under contract.100 Under 
Article 45, “[Freedom of movement for workers] shall entail the right, subject 
to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health: (a) to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move freely 
within the territory of Member States for this purpose . . . .”101 Supporters of 
the transfer fees argued that the regulations were necessary “to maintain a 
financial and competitive balance between clubs.”102 They also argued that the 
transfer fees support “the search for talent and the training of young 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at I-5062, I-5073–74. 
 97 Article 45 of the TFEU reads as follows: 
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union. 
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality 
between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other 
conditions of work and employment. 
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health: 
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made; 
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose; 
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the 
provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action; 
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, 
subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the 
Commission. 
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service. 
TFEU art. 45. 
 98 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5068. 
 99 TFEU art. 45. 
 100 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5062. 
 101 TFEU art. 45. 
 102 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5057. 
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players.”103 The court, however, agreed with Bosman who argued that the 
regulations did not create a financial or competitive balance between clubs.104 
The rich clubs were still able to obtain the most talented players and a club’s 
financial resources were still a factor in its level of competition.105 Therefore, 
the ECJ concluded that Article 45 precludes sporting associations from 
requiring a transfer fee for a player who wants to transfer at the expiration of 
his contract,106 that is, an “out-of-contract” transfer. The case did not address a 
player’s ability to move to another team when he is still under his current 
contract.107 
The second question focused on whether UEFA’s 3+2 rule obstructed the 
free movement of workers by limiting the number of non-national players 
allowed to play for a club in official matches.108 The ECJ called these 
regulations nationality clauses.109 Opponents of the nationality clauses relied 
on Article 45(2), which prohibits discrimination of workers in the European 
Union based on nationality because it obstructs the free movement for 
workers.110 Proponents of the nationality clauses argued that they were created 
on non-economic grounds to uphold the link between the players, the clubs, 
and their countries.111 They claimed that the nationality clauses allowed clubs 
to properly represent their countries in international matches and helped the 
fans identify with the clubs.112 These arguments failed, however, because these 
rules applied to all official matches, not just specialized international matches 
such as the World Cup, which require players to represent their national 
teams.113 
The proponents of the nationality clauses also pointed out that the transfer 
rules were drafted in collaboration with the European Commission, which has 
the goal of proposing rules consistent with European law.114 In response to this 
argument, the ECJ pointed out that “the Commission may not give guarantees 
 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at I-5073. 
 107 See DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 5. 
 108 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5073. 
 109 Id. at I-5049. 
 110 Id. at I-5074; see supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 111 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5075. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at I-5076. 
 114 Id. 
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concerning the compatibility of specific practices with the Treaty.”115 
Additionally, the Commission never has the authority to support practices that 
contradict the Treaty.116 Therefore, the Court concluded that Article 45 
precludes sporting associations from creating regulations that limit the number 
of players a club may field from outside its nation.117 The ECJ decided not to 
answer the two questions with respect to Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty, 
which deal with competition law,118 because both of the regulations in question 
violated Article 45 of the Treaty.119 
C. Transfers After the Bosman Case 
The Bosman case was limited to “out-of-contract” players, that is, players 
whose contract had ended.120 Because of the case’s limited application, FIFA 
and UEFA could still enforce transfer fees for players under contract.121 As a 
result, clubs began extending the terms of players’ contracts to prevent their 
players from moving to another team without being able to collect a transfer 
fee.122 Clubs even “forced players to sign a new contract before the old one 
expired.”123 In an attempt to offset the revenue lost from out-of-contract 
transfer fees, clubs would charge huge transfer fees when players broke their 
contracts before the end of the term.124 Although this replaced some of the lost 
income, it did not replace it all. The competitive imbalance began to increase. 
Small clubs that previously depended on transfer fees as a source of income 
were not receiving enough money to attract quality players.125 The larger clubs 
could offer the best players better-paid contracts by diverting the money that 
 
 115 Id. at I-5078. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See TFEU arts. 101–02. 
 119 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5078. 
 120 DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 5. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT 640 (Wladimir Andreff & Stefan Szymański eds, 2006). 
 124 DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 5; see also ROGER BLANPAIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF SPORTSMEN AND 
SPORTSWOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND BELGIAN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAW 215 (2003). 
 125 Simon Stone, FIFA Fears for Small Clubs Over Transfer Abolition, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 1, 2000), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/fifa-fears-for-small-clubs-over-transfer-
abolition-637523.html. 
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was previously allocated to transfer fees to players’ salaries.126 Players’ 
salaries also increased due to inflow of broadcasting revenues in the 1990s.127 
Additionally, the abolition of the 3+2 rule fostered an increase in 
international transfers.128 There was “a 1,800 percent increase in foreign 
players in the [English] Premiership”129 over the four years following the 
Bosman decision.130 Clubs also began to enter into exchange agreements and 
form alliances with clubs from different national associations within Europe.131 
Some European clubs exploited this opportunity by forming exchange 
agreements with other national associations within the EU that have more 
flexible nationality and work permit rules.132 This grants the clubs access to 
talented non-EU nationals who can achieve EU status more easily in a different 
EU country.133 Clubs also began making deals with non-European clubs to 
expand their talent pools.134 For example, Ajax of Amsterdam “entered into a 
franchise agreement in South Africa,” giving them priority over new players 
who exhibit great potential.135 
The abolition of the 3+2 rule also led clubs to invest in foreign youth.136 
After the Bosman case, “clubs in countries such as Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, [saw] their young 
football talents ‘stolen’ by wealthier teams from England, Italy, and Spain who 
offer[ed] better-paid contracts.”137 Rather than spending more money on 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 Simon Gardiner & Roger Welch, ‘Show Me the Money’ Regulation of the Migration of Professional 
Sportsmen in Post-Bosman Europe, in PROFESSIONAL SPORT IN THE EU: REGULATION AND RE-REGULATION 
107, 114 (Andrew Caiger & Simon Gardiner eds., 2000).  
 128 Id. 
 129 The Premiership, also known as the Premier League, is a division of twenty elite English football 
clubs. About Us, PREMIER LEAGUE, http://www.premierleague.com/page/Contact (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
The membership of these twenty clubs is dependent of their level of performance, and the clubs are technically 
shareholders of the Premier League. Id. The Premier League comes under the jurisdiction of the Football 
Association, the national football association for England, and UEFA. See id. 
 130 Gardiner & Welch, supra note 127, at 117.  
 131 Id. at 114–15.  
 132 For example, the English club Manchester United likely entered into an agreement with Royal 
Antwerp, a Belgian club, because of their “more permissive nationality and work permits rules.” Id.  
 133 Id. at 115. 
 134 Id.  
 135 Id. This agreement is still in force, and the South African franchise Ajax Cape Town is still operating 
today. See AJAX CAPE TOWN, http://www.ajaxct.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 136 PAULO DAVID, HUMAN RIGHTS IN YOUTH SPORT: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN 
COMPETITIVE SPORTS 173–74 (2005). 
 137 Id. at 174. 
LEMBO GALLEYSFINAL 6/28/2011  10:46 AM 
552 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25 
training academies138 for their own players, clubs would scout foreign talent at 
the biggest youth competitions in Europe.139 Clubs tended to favor this 
approach because of the greater certainty in recruiting young players who 
showed promise at these competitions.140 Many clubs preferred investing in 
young foreign players rather than their own youth training academies.141 
Investment in foreign youth, however, has led to harmful effects, particularly 
in creating an illegal market for fake agents to traffic minors from Africa to 
Europe.142 
III.  FIFA AND UEFA TRANSFER REGULATIONS AFTER THE BOSMAN RULING 
This Part discusses FIFA’s initial defiance of the ruling in Bosman and its 
eventual compliance with the European Commission, which resulted in the 
creation of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players in 
2001.143 These new regulations, however, did not sufficiently protect minors 
and resulted in some of the same negative effects, such as importing foreign 
youth discussed below in Part IV. FIFA revised the transfer rules again in 2005 
and made significant changes to the transfer rules for minors.144 These 
regulations were a step in the right direction, but significant problems 
remained. The regulations required clubs to ensure proper education and 
training for the minors in certain circumstances, but not all, and there were still 
enough loopholes in the system for clubs to continue to transfer minors 
internationally.145 In 2005, UEFA created new player eligibility restrictions, 
which required clubs to reserve a certain number of spots on their roster for 
 
 138 Most recently, FIFA has defined “training academy” as “an organisation or an independent legal entity 
whose primary, long-term objective is to provide players with long-term training through the provision of the 
necessary training facilities and infrastructure. This shall primarily include, but not be limited to, football 
training centres, football camps, football schools, etc.” FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 6. 
 139 DAVID, supra note 136, at 173–74. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See infra notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
 143 DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 3. 
 144 The FIFA Circular regarding the 2005 FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, 
however, did not mention that the rule changes were meant to protect minors. See Circular No. 959: FIFA 
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, FIFA (Mar. 16, 2005), http://www.fifa.com/mm/ 
document/affederation/administration/circular_959_en_92.pdf. Cf. Circular No. 1190: Revised Regulations on 
the Status of Transfers of Players–Protection of Minors, FIFA (May 20, 2009), http://www.fifa.com/mm/ 
document/affederation/administration/01/06/29/81/circularno.1190-revisedregulationsonthestatusandtransferof 
players-protectionofminors.pdf. Rather, it focused more on jurisdictional issues regarding the Players’ Status 
Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Circular No. 959: FIFA Regulations for the Status and 
Transfer of Players, supra. 
 145 See infra note 186. 
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locally trained players, due to the influx of foreign players after the Bosman 
decision. 
A. FIFA’s Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (2001) 
Despite all the problems resulting from the clubs’ reactions to the Bosman 
decision, FIFA was reluctant to reform the transfer system, mainly because in-
contract transfers constituted almost ninety percent of transfer revenues.146 
After many debates and negotiations between FIFA, UEFA, and the 
Commission, FIFA formalized new transfer regulations entitled the 
Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP (2001)”), which 
entered into force in September 2001.147 RSTP (2001) set forth five major 
provisions for the new transfer system. 
First, the regulations required that the term of players’ contracts be at least 
one year, but no more than five years.148 This regulation was likely adopted to 
prevent clubs from creating overly long terms for players’ contracts so that 
they would be more likely to get a transfer fee from a player who transferred 
before his contract expired. FIFA, however, also wanted to promote stability of 
players’ contracts, which resulted in the creation of a protected period after a 
player signs his first professional contract during which he cannot unilaterally 
terminate the contract.149 Depending on the player’s age, this protected period 
would last two to three years.150 
Second, RSTP (2001) only permitted international transfers during two 
designated transfer windows per season. It created one short transfer window 
in the middle of each season and one longer transfer window before the start of 
each season.151 Each player could only transfer between national associations 
once during the season.152 Additionally, the shorter mid-season window was 
limited to transfers “for strictly sport-related reasons, such as technical 
adjustments to a team or the replacement of injured players, or in exceptional 
circumstances.”153 
 
 146 James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle Over European Football’s Transfer System, 56 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 667, 688–89 (2002). 
 147 FIFA, REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (2001), reprinted in BLANPAIN, 
supra note 124, at 214 [hereinafter FIFA RSTP (2001)]. 
 148 Id. at 215. 
 149 Id. at 219–24. 
 150 Id. at 221. 
 151 Id. at 216. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Irving, supra note 146, at 717. 
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Third, RSTP (2001) created a registration system that enabled FIFA and 
the national associations to keep track of the transfers.154 The regulations 
required that each “player wishing to play . . . in any competition organized or 
recognized by a national association [be] registered with that association.”155 A 
national association could only register a player from another association upon 
the receipt of an international registration transfer certificate from the player’s 
former association.156 Unlike the transfer certificates that were held to violate 
the treaty in Bosman, issuance of an international registration transfer 
certificate “may not be made subject to any conditions” or fees.157 A national 
association shall not issue the certificate, however, “if a contractual dispute has 
arisen in the context of the player changing clubs.”158 In this situation, the 
association withholding the certificate must inform the requesting association 
of the contractual dispute with the player, and the requesting association may 
then request FIFA’s intervention.159 
Fourth, RSTP (2001) included a section dedicated to enhancing the 
protection of minors, defined as players under the age of eighteen.160 The 
section had two parts. First, national associations within the EU or the 
European Economic Area (“EU/EEA”) were not permitted to register minors 
who were nationals of a country outside the EU/EEA.161 The only exception 
was for nationals outside of the EU/EEA who moved to a country within the 
EU/EEA for reasons unrelated to football.162 Second, players within the 
EU/EEA territory could be traded “between the minimum working age in the 
new training club’s country and the age of 18.”163 Another provision also 
restricted clubs and minors from entering into a contract with a term longer 
than three years.164 Therefore, a contract signed by a seventeen year-old player 
could last at its longest until the player reached the age of twenty. 
Finally, RSTP (2001) created the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber 
(“DRC”) “to deal with disputes over compensation, sporting just cause, and 
 
 154 FIFA RSTP (2001), supra note 147, at 216. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 218. 
 158 Id. at 217. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 219–20. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 226. 
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mid-contract breaches.”165 This arbitration system was created “[w]ithout 
prejudice to the right of any player or club to seek redress before a civil court 
in disputes between clubs and players.”166 Additionally, “[t]he dispute 
resolution system and arbitration system [was to] take account of all relevant 
arrangements, laws and/or collective bargaining agreements, which exist at 
national levels, as well as the specificity of sport.”167 RSTP (2001) also 
provided that parties were allowed to appeal the decisions of the DRC the 
Arbitration Tribunal for Football.168 
Since 2002, FIFA has recognized that the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(“CAS”) exercises the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal for Football.169 
The International Olympic Committee created CAS in 1983 to serve as an 
international arbitration body for sports-related issues.170 CAS’s main 
headquarters are in Lausanne, Switzerland, and additional courts are located in 
New York City and in Sydney.171 Although CAS does not generally act as a 
court of appeals, it agreed to do so for FIFA’s DRC. Under the August 2009 
edition of the FIFA Statutes, FIFA empowers CAS “to resolve disputes 
between FIFA, Members, Confederations, Leagues, clubs, Players, Officials 
and licensed match agents and players’ agents.”172 A person must lodge an 
appeal with CAS within twenty-one days of notification of a final decision 
“passed by FIFA’s legal bodies . . . [or] Confederations, Members, or 
Leagues.”173 The CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration provisions “shall 
apply to the proceedings [and] CAS shall primarily apply the various 
regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law.”174 Therefore, EU law does 
not play a significant role in CAS’s decisions. 
 
 165 Irving, supra note 146, at 719. 
 166 FIFA RSTP (2001), supra note 147, at 230. 
 167 Id. at 231. 
 168 Id. 
 169 DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 40. 
 170 Bruno Simma, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984–
2004, at 21, 21 (Ian S. Blackshaw et al. eds., 2006). 
 171 JEAN-LOUP CHAPPELET & BRENDA KÜBLER-MABBOT, THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE 
AND THE OLYMPIC SYSTEM 129 (2008). 
 172 FIFA STATUTES, supra note 23, at 44. 
 173 Id. at 44. 
 174 Id. 
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B. FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (2005) 
In December 2004, FIFA revised RSTP (2001).175 FIFA explained that the 
revisions were meant to clarify previous rules and create a more “user-
friendly” structure.176 These new regulations entered into force on July 1, 
2005.177 The new regulations were based on RSTP (2001), but made important 
changes with respect to the protection of minors.178 This section focuses on 
those changes and gives a brief comparison with the RSTP (2001) provisions 
regarding minors. These new transfer regulations are referred to as RSTP 
(2005).179 
RSTP (2005) revised the regulations regarding the international transfer of 
minors that were set out in RSTP (2001).180 Article 19(2) of RSTP (2005) 
prohibited international transfers for all players under the age of eighteen 
except for three enumerated circumstances: 
(a) The player’s parents move to the country in which the New Club is 
located for reasons not linked to football; or 
(b) The transfer takes place within the territory of the European Union 
(EU) or European Economic Area (EEA) and the player is aged 
between 16 and 18 . . . ; or 
(c) The player lives no further than 50km from a national border, and 
the club for which the player wishes to be registered in the 
neighbouring Association is also within 50km of that border. The 
maximum distance between the player’s domicile and the club’s 
quarters shall be 100km. In such cases, the player must continue to 
live at home and the two Associations concerned must give their 
explicit consent.181 
RSTP (2005) set an international standard of sixteen years old as the 
minimum age at which a player could transfer to another team within the 
 
 175 DE WEGER, supra note 22, at 7. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Compare supra notes 160–64, with FIFA, REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS 
(2005) [hereinafter FIFA RSTP (2005)], available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/ 
administration/50/02/49/status_transfer_en_25.pdf. 
 179 FIFA RSTP (2005), supra note 178, at 16–17. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. at 16. Under (b), the New Club must fulfill certain minimum obligations that involve a particular 
standard of football training, education, and living. See infra notes 187–88 and accompanying text. 
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EU/EEA.182 Under RSTP (2001), however, each country in the EU/EEA could 
establish its own minimum age according to its national laws.183 RSTP (2005) 
also added a provision for minors who live within fifty to one hundred 
kilometers from another country’s club.184 Additionally, RSTP (2005) 
continued to prohibit minors from entering contracts with a term longer than 
three years.185 According to FIFA, these regulations are intended “to safeguard 
the interests of young players and not hinder their progress through an 
excessive tie with a club.”186 
The exception allowing players between the ages of sixteen and eighteen to 
transfer within the EU and the EEA is of particular importance to this 
Comment and is discussed further. For now, it is important to note that clubs 
that sign a player who falls into this category must meet four additional 
demands to ensure a legal transfer.187 Most of these demands involve measures 
to protect the children. The new club must: (1) “provide the player with an 
adequate football education and/or training in line with the highest national 
standards;” (2) guarantee an education “which will allow the player to pursue a 
career other than football;” (3) ensure that the player “is looked after in the 
best possible way” by providing housing with optimal living standards, a club 
mentor, etcetera; and (4) provide its association with proof of compliance.188 
These requirements are definitely a step in the right direction toward stronger 
protection for minors, but is shown in Part IV that the rules are insufficient 
because they have too many loopholes that clubs can use to recruit 
international minors.189 
C. CAS Decision Expanding FIFA RSTP (2005) 
In 2008, the CAS handed down a decision stating that the exceptions 
regarding the international transfer of minors under Article 19(2) of RSTP 
(2005) were not exhaustive, and FIFA could add two further exceptions 
 
 182 Id. 
 183 FIFA RSTP (2001), supra note 147, at 220. 
 184 FIFA RSTP (2005), supra note 178, at 16. 
 185 Id. at 15. 
 186 FIFA, COMMENTARY ON THE REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS 53 (2006), 
available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/56/07/transfer_commentary_ 
06_en_1843.pdf. 
 187 FIFA RSTP (2005), supra note 178, at 16. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See infra Part IV. 
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regarding students.190 First, players can transfer internationally if they can 
prove “without any doubt” that their reason for relocation was academic and 
not athletic.191 Second, international transfers of minors are allowed if the 
player’s original association and new club have a signed agreement “within the 
scope of a development program for young players.”192 This second exception 
must meet “certain strict conditions.”193 In a parenthetical following this 
requirement, the CAS mentions “agreement on the academic and/or school 
education [and] authorization granted for a limited time” as elements of the 
conditions that pertain to the second exception.194 Therefore, if a club enters 
into an international player exchange agreement following the certain strict 
requirements, then the players may be transferred internationally without 
violating Article 19 of RSTP (2005). Additionally, the CAS held that Article 
19 of RSTP (2005) “applies equally to amateur and professional minor 
players,”195 closing a loophole used by clubs in the past.196 
D. UEFA Home-Grown Rule 
In response to the influx of foreign players on European teams and the 
decrease in investment in youth training academies, UEFA created new player 
eligibility rules in 2005.197 UEFA hoped that these rules would protect minors 
and re-nationalize and re-localize clubs.198 These player eligibility rules are 
colloquially referred to as the “home-grown” rule.199 UEFA enforced these 
rules in the 2006–2007 season and they are still in force as of the writing of 
 
 190 FC Midtjylland A/S v. Fédération Internationale de Football Ass’n, CAS 2008/A/1485, ¶ 7.3.3. (Ct. 
Arb. Sport 2008). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. ¶ 7.2.4. 
 196 Id. ¶ 7.2.3. Under the FIFA RSTP (2009), “a professional is a player who has a written contract with a 
club and is paid more for his footballing activity than the expenses he effectively incurs. All other players are 
considered to be amateurs.” FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 9. 
 197 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 21 (2006/2007) 
[hereinafter UEFA REGULATIONS (2006/2007)], available at http://www.eurocups.ru/docs/cl-06_07-rules.pdf; 
Lindsay Valaine Briggs, UEFA v. The European Community: Attempts of the Governing Body of European 
Soccer to Circumvent EU Freedom of Movement and Antidiscrimination Labor Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 439, 
441 (2005). 
 198 Briggs, supra note 197, at 440–41. 
 199 UNION OF EUR. FOOTBALL ASS’NS, THE EUROPEAN CLUB FOOTBALLING LANDSCAPE: CLUB LICENSING 
BENCHMARKING REPORT FINANCIAL YEAR 2009, at 29 (2009) [hereinafter CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARKING 
REPORT]. 
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this Comment.200 The rules create registration regulations that require clubs to 
reserve space on the roster for “locally trained players.”201 Specifically, of the 
twenty-five players that can be registered to “List A,”202 four have to be locally 
trained.203 “Locally trained” players are divided into two subgroups “club-
trained” players and “association-trained” players.204 A “club-trained” player is 
a player of any nationality who has been registered with the current club for 
three entire seasons between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one.205 An 
“association-trained” player is a player of any nationality who has been 
registered with a club or clubs associated with the same national association 
for three entire seasons between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one.206 The 
effect of this regulation is to establish a minimum quota of “home-grown” 
players—players with ties to a particular team or country.207 
In the 2007–2008 season, the quota increased to six locally trained players 
with at least three players qualifying as “club-trained.”208 The quota increased 
again for the 2008–2009 season to eight “locally-trained” players with at least 
four “club-trained” players.209 The quota remained the same for the 2009–2010 
season, but UEFA made slight changes regarding the age requirement.210 As 
the quotas increased, the clubs’ ability to recruit foreign players diminished. 
 
 200 Id. 
 201 UEFA REGULATIONS (2006/2007), supra note 197, at 22. 
 202 Id.; UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 22–23 (2007/2008) 
[hereinafter UEFA REGULATIONS (2007/2008)], available at http://www.uefa.com/newsfiles/19071.pdf. 
17.01 In order to be eligible to participate in the UEFA club competitions, players must be 
registered with UEFA within the requested deadlines to play for a club and fulfill all the 
conditions set out in the following provisions . . . . 
17.02 Each club is responsible for submitting an A list of players (“List A”) and a B list of 
players (“List B”), duly signed, to its national association for verification, validation and 
forwarding to UEFA. 
Id. 
 203 UEFA REGULATIONS (2006/2007), supra note 197, at 22. 
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 207 CLUB LICENSING BENCHMARKING REPORT, supra note 199, at 29. 
 208 UEFA REGULATIONS (2007/2008), supra note 202, at 23. 
 209 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 22 (2008/2009), 
available at http://www.uefa.com/multimediafiles/download/regulations/uefa/others/70/22/60/702260_ 
download.pdf. 
 210 UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE, REGULATIONS OF THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 25 (2009/2010), 
available at http://www.uefa.com/multimediafiles/download/competitions/UCL/88/61/44/886144_download. 
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Due to this difficulty of manning rosters with top players under the constraints 
of the home-grown rule, some teams could not compete at prior levels.211 
Proponents of the home-grown rule believe that it will help decrease the 
financial disparity and competitive imbalance between football teams.212 Other 
supporters of the rule, such as Richard Scudamore, the chief executive of the 
Premier League,213 believe that the rule will “give clubs an extra incentive to 
invest in youth.”214 Scudamore denies that the rule will give clubs incentives to 
hoard young foreign players.215 Proponents also believe that the rule will stop 
clubs from spending so much money on outside talent, encouraging investment 
in home-grown talent instead.216 These arguments, however, are not persuasive 
and are flawed. First, clubs continue to have an incentive to recruit abroad. 
While the club’s home country may produce top players, a club cannot rely on 
what is only a possibility. Therefore, to be sure that they can meet the home-
grown quota, clubs must recruit promising foreign players while they are still 
young enough to meet the registration requirement of three seasons between 
the ages of fifteen and twenty-one. Second, the rule may not re-nationalize 
teams. Home-grown does not mean citizen. In fact, under the home-grown rule, 
a club could meet the home-grown quota with a team comprised wholly of 
foreign players. 
A more pressing issue, however, is whether the quotas accord with EU 
laws regarding the free movement of workers.217 As discussed earlier, the 
Bosman case held that UEFA’s rule requiring quotas for national players was 
incompatible with European Community law.218 As argued in the Bosman 
case, however, proponents of nationality restrictions believe that the court 
 
 211 For example, manager of the Liverpool club, Rafael Benítez, opposes the adoption of the eight home-
grown player quota and believes that the league should focus on quality, not quantity. Andy Hunter, Rafael 
Benítez Hits Out at Home-Grown Ruling for Missing the Point, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 16, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/sep/16/liverpool-rafael-benitez-homegrown. 
 212 ARNAUT, supra note 37, at 48–49. 
 213 See supra note 129. 
 214 Premier League Announce Home-grown Quota, FIFA.COM (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.fifa.com/ 
worldfootball/clubfootball/news/newsid=1101646.html. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 UEFA ‘Home-Grown Player’ Rule May End Up in Court, Says EU Law Professor, EURACTIVE (June 
3, 2005), http://www.euractiv.com/en/sports/uefa-home-grown-player-rule-may-court-eu-law-professor/ 
article-139418. 
 218 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-
5040, I-5078. 
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should allow exceptions for sporting associations.219 Nevertheless, outside of 
specific competitions based on nationality,220 the ECJ has yet to make 
exceptions when applying free movement and anti-discrimination laws to 
sporting regulations. 
IV.  GETTING AROUND THE FIFA REGULATIONS: LOOPHOLES USED BY 
EUROPEAN CLUBS TO OBTAIN MINORS 
Now that the UEFA home-grown player quota has increased to eight,221 
clubs have a greater incentive to seek out young international talent to enroll in 
their local training academies because these players can be counted in a club’s 
home-grown quota. Clubs also seek out young talent because the younger 
players are generally less expensive, which allows clubs to profit significantly. 
Younger players and foreign players come at a lower purchase price,222 which 
allows clubs to make a significant profit if the players go on to have a 
successful professional career.223 For example, in 2003, Arsenal picked up 
Cesc Fàbregas when he was sixteen on a free transfer from the Barcelona 
youth team.224 In 2009 he was valued at £25 million.225 Therefore, European 
clubs have an incentive to purchase players at a young age so they can meet 
their home-grown quotas and make a profit if the player decides to transfer 
when he is eligible to sign a professional contract. Even if just one or two of 
these young players succeed professionally, clubs will reap the benefits.226 
This encourages clubs to find as many loopholes as possible in the FIFA 
regulations regarding the transfer of minors and to exploit those loopholes for 
commercial benefit. Investigative reporters have even found that the big clubs 
have spent large sums of money to find these loopholes and to see just how far 
 
 219 Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, at I-4974, Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de 
Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5040. For example, the UEFA argued that transfer rules were 
needed to “maintain financial and competitive equilibrium” in football, and to “support the cultivation of talent 
in youth and development schemes.” P.E. Morris, S. Morrow & P.M. Spink, EC Law and Professional 
Football: Bosman and Its Implications, 59 MOD. L. REV. 893, 895 (1996). 
 220 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at I-5076. 
 221 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 222 See, e.g., Mike Norrish, Arsene Wenger’s Top Five Arsenal Signings, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 22, 2009), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/leagues/premierleague/arsenal/5200319/Arsene-Wengers-top-five-
Arsenal-signings.html (describing a number of bargain player acquisitions by Arsenal). 
 223 See The Big Question: As the Football Transfer Window Closes, Is Spending Out of Control?, 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/the-big-
question-as-the-football-transfer-window-closes-is-spending-out-of-control-915623.html. 
 224 Norrish, supra note 222. 
 225 Id. 
 226 See, e.g., supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text. 
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they can push the envelope.227 When it comes down to it, European football is 
a commercialized sport and clubs will seemingly do anything to make a higher 
profit, even if that means risking the well-being of children.228 This Part 
discusses three ways European clubs circumvent the transfer regulations to 
obtain these minors. 
First, many clubs use the exception under Article 19(2)(a), which allows 
minors under the age of eighteen to transfer internationally if the child’s 
parents move to the country for “reasons not linked to football.”229 Clubs have 
resorted to creating local jobs for parents and even bribing them so that their 
children can register with the club in accordance with the FIFA regulations.230 
Two Norwegian reporters, Madsen and Johansson, who conducted an 
investigation of the unspoken and often illegal practices of European clubs 
regarding the transfer of minors, found agents and clubs who admitted to 
offering parents jobs.231 One father was given a position as a gardener in the 
stadium; another as the team bus driver.232 
Second, clubs are obtaining young players through exchange agreements 
with clubs in Africa and countries in the EU with flexible visa and immigration 
policies.233 According to CAS’s decision in 2009,234 minors can transfer 
internationally if their current club has an exchange agreement with the foreign 
club.235 The exchange agreement, however, must be “within the scope of a 
development program for young players” and meet certain requirements.236 For 
example, the exchange agreement must contain specific information regarding 
the minor’s academic education.237 Dutch clubs Ajax and Feyenoord operate 
 
 227 See generally LARS BACKE MADSEN & JENS M. JOHANSSON, DEN FORSVUNNE DIAMANTEN [The Lost 
Diamond] (2008). 
 228 See, e.g., Kay Jay, Talent Spotting or Child Trafficking?, YOUTH.SG (Sept. 17, 2009), http://app.youth. 
sg/Home/Articles/tabid/94/id/709/cid/0/Default.aspx. 
 229 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 19–20. 
 230 For example, Manchester United allegedly offered Paul Pogba’s parents €100,000 each and a house so 
that their son would transfer from France. Manchester United Paid Paul Pogba’s Parents, Le Havre President 
Alleges, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/sep/07/paul-pogba-
manchester-united. 
 231 See MADSEN & JOHANSSON, supra note 227. 
 232 See id. 
 233 See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 234 Midtjylland A/S v. Fédération Internationale de Football Ass’n, CAS 2008/A/1485, ¶ 7.3.3. (Ct. Arb. 
Sport 2008); see supra Part III.C. 
 235 CAS 2008/A/1485, FC Midtjylland A/S v. Fédération Internationale de Football Ass’n, ¶ 7.3.3. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
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training academies in Ghana,238 and “French clubs such as Paris Saint-Germain 
and Monaco . . . maintain scouting networks in the region.”239 European clubs 
are not only using these loopholes to secure players in Africa, but all over the 
world. Even a sixteen-year-old American-born player, whose grandfather lives 
in Italy, worked to obtain an EU passport so he could play with the English 
club, West Ham United.240 
Unfortunately, the demand for inexpensive young players has also resulted 
in an influx of unregistered training academies241 and unlicensed agents who 
take advantage of minors who play football, particularly in Africa.242 Seeing 
the top African players, such as Dider Drogba and Samuel Etò, on European 
teams, gives young African players hopes and dreams of success in Europe,243 
making it easy for these agents to lure them there with false hopes of becoming 
a star footballer.244 Parents pay these fake agents with what little money they 
have to send their children to Europe,245 but more often than not the young 
boys never register with an academy.246 If the boys do not register, many 
agents abandon them in Europe without a European passport or money to 
purchase a plane ticket back home.247 That these players are so inexpensive 
compared to European players means that the agents can recruit many players 
at once.248 Moussa N’diayè, a Senegalese football player, commented on the 
problem noting that “[i]t is always worth sending 100 [African players to 
Europe]—the agent can make money from the one or two who make it. The 
 
 238 DAVID GOLDBLATT, THE BALL IS ROUND: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF SOCCER 715 (2008); see also Dan 
McDougall, The Scandal of Africa’s Trafficked Players, OBSERVER (London), Jan. 6, 2008, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jan/06/newsstory.sport4. 
 239 McDougall, supra note 238. 
 240 Noah Davis, Davis’ Discussions: Sebastian Lletget Leaves, GOAL.COM (May 29, 2009, 6:04:57 AM), 
http://www.goal.com/en-us/news/66/united-states/2009/05/29/1292893/davis-discussions-sebastian-lletget-
leaves. The one benefit of these European operated training academies is that the boys who attend receive 
proper education and training. McDougall, supra note 238. Parents will pay money for their children to attend 
these “training academies,” even though they are not proper training facilities. Id. 
 241 McDougall, supra note 238. 
 242 GOLDBLATT, supra note 238, at 701. 
 243 Colin Brown, Football Chiefs to Tackle Hidden Trade in Africa’s Children, INDEPENDENT (July 5, 
2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/football-chiefs-to-tackle-hidden-trade-
in-africas-children-860504.html. 
 244 Id.; see also, GOLDBLATT, supra note 238, at 701. 
 245 McDougall, supra note 238 (“There is now a huge business to be made from football, says Mbvoumin, 
and it feeds on people’s dreams of a better life for their family. ‘In Africa, when an important man tells a 
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 246 GOLDBLATT, supra note 238, at 701. 
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other 98 are forgotten.”249 Belgian senator, Jean-Marie Dedecker, conducted an 
investigation and found “422 cases of illegal trade with Nigerian players in 
Belgium alone.”250 
Finally, certain European clubs benefit due to differences in contract law 
throughout the EU and differences in the national associations’ rules regarding 
the age minors can sign professional contracts.251 For example, the Italian 
Football Federation, Federazione Italiana Gioco Calcio, prohibits players from 
signing professional club contracts until they are 18.252 In Britain, however, 
“[p]layers from European Union countries are able to move to Britain on 
academy or scholarship contracts at 16, and to sign full professional contracts 
at 17.”253 Due to these limitations, many sixteen-year-old Italian boys have 
joined English clubs.254 In 2009, sixteen-year-old Federico Macheda left the 
Italian club, SS Lazio, to play for Manchester United.255 The Lazio President 
tried everything he could to keep Macheda on the team, but it was impossible 
for him to compete with an offer for a professional contract.256 
Clubs also try to sign young players to commitment contracts so that once 
they reach the professional age they have to play for that club.257 In 2008, 
when Jeremy Helan, a seventeen-year-old player for the French club, Rennes, 
joined the English club, Manchester City,258 FIFA began an investigation to 
determine whether there was a violation of the RSTP involving an inducement 
 
 249 Id. 
 250 Kasper Lindberg, The Man Who Traced 422 Soccer Slaves, PLAY GAME MAG. (2006) http://www. 
playthegame.org/upload/Magazine%202005/themanwhotraced442slaves.pdf. 
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ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.in.com/news/sports/fullstory-premier-leagues-big-four-
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1.html. 
 252 Raelin MacGrevy, The Final Word on Federico Macheda, SOCCERLENS (Apr. 16, 2009), http:// 
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 255 Inside World Soccer, Lazio Rue Macheda Transfer, INSIDE WORLD SOCCER (Apr. 6, 2009), 
http://www.insideworldsoccer.com/2009/04/lazio-rues-macheda-transfer.html. 
 256 Id. 
 257 See, e.g., Johnny Crossan, The Transfer of Minors: A Euro Problem?, VITAL CITY http://www. 
manchestercity.vitalfootball.co.uk/article.asp?a=170202 (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (discussing the French use 
of the Pre-Contract Agreement). 
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to breach a contract.259 Helan signed a contract with Rennes at the age of 
thirteen, which stated that if he played for the French team while at the youth 
academy he would be obligated to sign a two-year professional contract with 
the team in the future.260 Helan has brought a case against the club in the 
French Labor Courts stating that the contract that he originally signed with 
Rennes is voidable under French law.261 As of the writing of this Comment, 
Helan’s action is pending.262 
A similar contractual dispute occurred with player Gaël Kakuta. Kakuta, 
who was a French national under contract with the French club Lens left to 
play with the English club Chelsea in 2007.263 On August 27, 2009, the DRC 
issued a decision regarding the contractual dispute over the international 
transfer of the minor player.264 The DRC found that Kakuta breached his 
contract and that Chelsea induced the breach.265 According to the Lens 
chairman, Gervais Martel, the decision was not surprising.266 Chelsea started 
contacting Kakuta before he was sixteen, and the French club had nurtured him 
since he was eight-and-a-half.267 The DRC decided that Kakuta must pay 
compensation of €780,000 and that Chelsea is jointly and severally liable for 
that compensation.268 In addition, the DRC ordered Chelsea to pay Lens a 
training compensation of €130,000.269 The DRC also placed a four-month 
restriction on Kakuta’s eligibility to play in official matches and placed a two-
year transfer ban on Chelsea.270 Therefore, FIFA’s decision on Kakuta implies 
that the DRC believes that contracts with minors are enforceable. As of the 
writing of this Comment, Chelsea has appealed the DRC’s decision to CAS, 
and CAS has granted a stay of the sanctions until it decides the case.271 
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V. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM CLUBS’ EFFORTS TO OBTAIN MINORS 
Although European clubs’ use of loopholes allows them to act within the 
FIFA regulations regarding the transfer of minors, many of the actions may 
violate international and European law. This Part first focuses on immigration 
law issues regarding third-country nationals272 throughout the EU and the free 
movement of workers within the EU.273 It then discusses international and 
European organizations and treaties dedicated to protect minors and eliminate 
trafficking in human beings.274 Finally, this Part gives an overview of the 
enforceability of contracts with minors in several countries in the EU.275 
A. Immigration and Migration Laws in the European Union 
1. Immigration of Third-Country Nationals 
As of the writing of this Comment, the EU does not have common 
immigration laws for third-country nationals, meaning persons who do not 
have citizenship within the EU.276 Accordingly, each member state has its own 
rules for granting visas, residence permits, and citizenship.277 All member 
states grant short-term visas, which are defined in EU legislation as visas that 
are for a duration of less than three months.278 The general regulation of the 
member states’ short-term visas falls under the EU authority,279 with the 
exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, which are exempt 
 
 272 A third-country national is defined in this Comment as a person who is a citizen of a country outside of 
the EU. 
 273 See infra Part V.A. 
 274 See infra Part V.B. 
 275 See infra Part V.C. 
 276 Int’l Org. for Migration, Comparative Study of the Laws in the 27 EU Member States for Legal 
Immigration, at 45, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 393.281 (Feb. 2008) [hereinafter EU Immigration Study]. The study 
was commissioned by the European Parliament. Id. at 9. But see TFEU art. 79(1) (“The Union shall develop a 
common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair 
treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced 
measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.”). 
 277 See EU Immigration Study, supra note 276, at 28–29. 
 278 Id. at 30. More specifically, EU legislation defines a short-term visa as follows: 
an authorization issued by a Member State or a decision taken by such State which is required 
with a view to: entry for an intended stay in that Member State or in several Member States of no 
more than three months in total; entry for transit through the territory of that Member State or 
several Member States, except for transit at an airport. 
Id. (quoting Council Regulation 539/2001, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 81) 1, 5 (EC)). 
 279 Id. 
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from the EU visa regulations due to certain opt-out provisions.280 Long-term 
visas are for a duration over three months.281 Only about one-third of the 
member states grant long-term visas,282 and these visas are generally a 
condition to present in-country residence permit applications.283 
When granting visas, the member states generally look to the third-country 
national’s purpose for entry to determine what type of visa is needed and 
whether it should be granted.284 Therefore, the member states have different 
categories of immigration that correspond with the various reasons third-
country immigrants move to host states.285 One category for admission listed 
by many member states is persons of a specific profession.286 Within this 
category, the member states often include specific provisions for athletes and 
coaches,287 which make certain states more attractive to third-country nationals 
wishing to play in Europe. 
Some states have fewer requirements for athletes while others do not have a 
similar specialized category and require athletes to follow standard procedures 
for entry. In the United Kingdom, work permits are only given to 
internationally distinguished football players.288 Specifically, “[a] player must 
have played in 75 percent of his country’s competitive ‘A’ national team 
matches over the past two years and he has to be coming from a country that 
ranks in the top 70 of FIFA rankings.”289 If the permit is denied, the 
contracting club can file a petition and deposit a fee to have a six-person board 
review the case and issue a final decision.290 In Sweden, the Swedish Sports 
Federation reviews all professional athletes’ applications for work permits.291 
It “must approve the contract and certify that the employment of the applicant 
sports-person is of particular importance for the development of that particular 
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 282 These member states include: Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Romania, and Slovenia. Id. 
 283 Accordingly these visas are sometimes called “immigration visas.” Id. 
 284 Id. at 28. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
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 288 Deanna Reiss, The Immigration Puzzle: Understanding U.S. and European Athlete Immigration Rules, 
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 289 Id. at 7–8. 
 290 Id. at 8. 
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branch of sport.”292 The fact that each member state has its own application 
process and method to review visas and work permits for professional athletes 
makes it very hard to regulate the entry of foreign athletes in the EU. 
2. Free Movement of Workers 
The EU institutions have authority over the movement of workers within 
the EU.293 As discussed in Part III.B regarding the Bosman case, the member 
states cannot impose restrictions on free movement of workers. FIFA and 
UEFA have argued for a sporting exception to the rule, but the ECJ and other 
EU institutions have yet to yield and allow exceptions.294 
In 2005, the ECJ confirmed and expanded the ruling in Bosman in 
Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura.295 Simutenkov, a Russian 
national who played football for a Spanish club, had a Spanish residence and a 
legal work permit.296 The Spanish Federation had a licensing system in place 
where players either held a non-Community or a Community license based on 
whether they were nationals of the EU/EEA.297 Clubs limited the number of 
non-Community licensed players allowed to play in national matches.298 
Simutenkov could not obtain a Community license and sued the team for 
violating an anti-discrimination provision of a partnership agreement between 
Russia and the EU.299 The ECJ held that anti-discrimination rules apply to 
foreign nationals who are legally employed in the EU through agreements with 
the EU.300 Therefore, any athlete who is a national of a country that has a 
partnership agreement with the EU and is legally employed in the EU is given 
the same rights as EU nationals, including the fundamental right of freedom of 
movement for workers.301 
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 293 See TFEU art. 45. 
 294 See supra Parts II–III. 
 295 Case C-265/03, Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, 2005 E.C.R. I-2596. 
 296 Id. at I-2600. 
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B. Child Labor and Human Trafficking 
Not all players enter the EU legally. Unfortunately, many unnecessary 
unlicensed agents bring young African players to Europe through illegal 
means: some children are brought over in boats,302 some children obtain 
limited visas for travel purposes, and sometimes embassy employees issue 
passports that raise the player’s age for bribes.303 If these young boys are not 
selected for a European team, they are often left without legal papers and no 
way back home.304 Many boys end up working on the streets selling fake 
purses and souvenirs to tourists.305 Countries throughout the world 
acknowledge that child labor and trafficking of human beings are gross 
violations of human rights by signing treaties to prevent them.306 Accordingly, 
several international organizations are dedicated to solving these problems, 
including the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), the International 
Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor (“IPEC”), and the International 
Organization of Migration (“IOM”). This Part gives an overview of the 
international and European treaties and organizations dedicated to protecting 
human rights. 
1. Child Labor and Human Trafficking in an International Context 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) was 
the first United Nations (“UN”) treaty to comprehensively address child 
labor.307 The CRC entered into force in 1990 with 140 signatories and 193 
parties.308 The CRC defines a child as “every human being below the age of 
eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
 
 302 In May 2007, an abandoned fishing trawler was found washed up on the shore of the Canary Islands in 
Spain with a cargo of 130 young African men. Dan McDougall, The Scandal of Africa’s Trafficked Players, 
OBSERVER (London), Jan. 6, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jan/06/newsstory.sport4. There 
were fifteen teenagers on board who believed that they were going to play for Marseille or Real Madrid. Id. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. 
 306 See Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 182]; United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 15, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 307 Alessandro Fodella, Freedom from Child Labour as a Human Right: The Role of the UN System in 
Implementing ILO Child Labour Standards, in CHILD LABOUR IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 203, 209 (Giuseppe 
Nesi et al. eds., 2008). 
 308 United Nations, Status of Treaties, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Jan. 29, 2011, 12:03 PM), 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en. 
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earlier.”309 The CRC provides for states parties to protect children from 
“economic exploitation” and “any work that is likely to be hazardous or to 
interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.”310 
Certain UN agencies have a goal of ensuring these rights for children and 
developing further protections. The ILO is an agency of the UN that works to 
promote certain international labor standards.311 Each year members of the ILO 
meet in Geneva at the International Labour Conference to establish and adopt 
international labor standards.312 In 1992, the ILO formed the IPEC—currently 
the largest program in the ILO—to progressively eliminate child labor in 
accordance with the CRC.313 A main priority for IPEC is to eliminate the worst 
forms of child labor, which are set out in the ILO Convention No. 182.314 
According to Convention No. 182, which has been ratified by 173 nations as of 
February 21, 2011,315 the worst forms of child labor include, among other 
things: “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and 
trafficking of children.”316 Unfortunately, ILO Convention No. 182 does not 
specifically define child trafficking,317 which creates problems with 
implementation and regulation. 
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Other organizations, such as the IOM, an intergovernmental organization 
developed to ensure and promote “humane and orderly migration” throughout 
the world,318 have developed definitions of trafficking. According to a bulletin 
written by the IOM, “[h]uman trafficking . . . is a new form of slavery that 
involves three stages: recruitment, transportation, and exploitation.”319 The 
IOM started its involvement in counter-trafficking in 1994.320 Since then, the 
IOM “has implemented almost 500 projects in 85 countries, and has provided 
assistance to approximately 15,000 trafficked persons.”321 In 2007, the IOM 
assisted thirty-four young football players back to their homes in Abidjan from 
Mali.322 The group of sixteen- to eighteen-year-old boys was apparently 
smuggled into Mali by an unscrupulous agent who collected $600 from their 
parents and promised a European football career for the boys.323 Although 
these young boys’ dreams to become European football players were shattered, 
the IOM protected these boys from living alone in the streets of Europe and 
brought them back home to their families.324 
2. Child Labor and Human Trafficking in an EU Context 
The EU has also recognized the problems of illegal immigration, human 
trafficking, and child labor within the EU.325 In 2005, the Council of Europe 
addressed the need to implement a plan to fight human trafficking in the EU,326 
in accordance with the Hague Programme.327 The Council noted that to 
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 323 Footballers’ Dreams of Fame in Europe Shattered, supra note 322. 
 324 Id. 
 325 See, e.g., EU Plan on Best Practices, Standards and Procedures for Combating and Preventing 
Trafficking in Human Beings, 2005 O.J. (C 311) 1, 1 [hereinafter EU Plan on Best Practices]. 
 326 Id. 
 327 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 1, 25 (Nov. 4–5, 2004). The Hague Programme 
lists ten priorities for the European Union in order to strengthen freedom, security, and justice in the five years 
following its passage. The Hague Programme: 10 Priorities for the Next Five Years, EUROPA (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l16002_en.
htm. 
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effectively combat “human trafficking an integrated approach is needed, 
having as its basis the respect of human rights and taking into account its 
global nature.”328 Additionally, Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union states: “The Union shall develop a common immigration 
policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration 
flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in member 
states, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal 
immigration and trafficking in human beings.”329 TFEU also states that “the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall adopt measures . . . [to] combat[] trafficking in 
persons, in particular women and children.”330 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“Charter”),331 
which was given full legal effect in 2009,332 also addresses the issue of human 
trafficking by simply stating that “[t]rafficking in human beings is 
prohibited.”333 The Charter is meant to ensure that EU regulations and 
directives do not contradict the European Convention of Human Rights.334 The 
Charter also covers several areas relating to children’s rights.335 Article 32 
covers the “[p]rohibition of child labour and protection of young people at 
work.”336 Under this Article, “[t]he minimum age of admission to employment 
 
 328 EU Plan on Best Practices, supra note 325, at 1. 
 329 TFEU art 77. 
 330 Id. 
 331 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007 O.J. (C 301) 1, 1 [hereinafter EU Rights 
Charter]. 
 332 The Charter of Fundamental Rights was first drafted in 2000. See id. At that time, the Charter was only 
given declarative status, meaning a symbolic non-legally binding status, under the Nice Treaty in 2001. 
MAURICE ROCHE, EXPLORING THE SOCIOLOGY OF EUROPE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL COMPLEX 
202 (2010). 
 333 EU Rights Charter, supra note 331, at 3. 
 334 THEODŌROS D. SAKELLAROPOULOS ET AL., CONNECTING WELFARE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL MODEL 206 (2004). 
 335 Holly Cullen, Children’s Rights, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: POLITICS, LAW AND 
POLICY 323, 323 (Steve Peers & Angela Ward eds., 2004). 
 336 Article 32 of the Charter reads as follows: 
The employment of children is prohibited. The minimum age of admission to employment may 
not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age, without prejudice to such rules as may be 
more favourable to young people and except for limited derogations. 
 
Young people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their age and be 
protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to harm their safety, health or 
physical, mental, moral or social development or to interfere with their education. 
EU Rights Charter, supra note 331, at 7. 
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may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age.”337 Currently, 
member states in the EU do not have a uniform minimum school-leaving 
age.338 Furthermore, Article 24, which covers general children’s rights, states: 
“In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or 
private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary 
consideration.”339 Under this Article, UEFA’s home-grown rule might be 
suspect. It does not seem that the children’s interests were a primary 
consideration in UEFA’s promulgation of the home-grown rule. As seen in 
Part IV, the rule has encouraged clubs to recruit young players from all across 
Europe. This might lead the player to change schools and location and 
negatively impact the child’s health and education.340 
C. Enforceability of Minors’ Contracts Under European Law 
The conflict of law between FIFA and member states of the EU is further 
complicated by the fact that no uniform legislation exists regarding substantive 
contract provisions in the EU.341 This explains why Helan is currently fighting 
in the French courts to prove that the contract he signed with his former French 
team as a thirteen-year-old is not enforceable against him.342 It is important to 
review the rules regarding the enforceability of minors’ contracts at a national 
level because the DRC must take into account the rules governing each dispute 
at a national level.343 
The member states’ jurisdictional differences regarding the enforceability 
of contracts with minors can be divided into three general categories: some 
countries only enforce the contracts if they are made with parental consent; 
others enforce contracts if they are for the overall benefit of the minor; and a 
 
 337 Id. 
 338 ANNE SONNET, JOBS FOR YOUTH: FRANCE 89 (2009); see also At What Age . . . ? Comparative Table, 
RIGHT TO EDUC., http://www.right-to-education.org/node/279 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). 
 339 EU Rights Charter, supra note 331, at 7. 
 340 See DAVID, supra note 136, at 33–35, 186–88. 
 341 The only legislation is a default rule regarding choice-of-law rules. See Regulation 593/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 
O.J. (L 177) (EC). 
 342 See supra notes 257–62 and accompanying text. 
 343 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 26. 
The Players’ Status Committee, the Dispute Resolution Chamber, the single judge or the DRC 
judge (as the case may be) shall, when taking their decisions, apply these regulations whilst 
taking into account all relevant arrangements, laws and/or collective bargaining agreements that 
exist at national level, as well as the specificity of sport. 
Id. 
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few countries do not enforce contracts with minors at all. Regardless of the 
approach, the public policy of protecting children is the key underlying 
influence. This policy comes in conflict with the realities of the business world 
when the people contracting with minors want assurances that the contracts are 
enforceable. This Subpart gives a brief overview of these laws. 
In Germany, minors have limited legal capacity from the ages of seven to 
eighteen.344 Minors can enter into binding contracts only with the consent of 
their parents.345 Very few exceptions to this rule exist.346 To determine the 
validity of a contract, judges focus only on whether the child had explicit or 
inferable consent from his parent or guardian to enter into the contract.347 The 
judges do not evaluate the utility of the contract or the benefits granted to the 
minor.348 Austrian code regarding the contractual capacity of minors349 is very 
similar to the German law.350 
These laws tend to ignore the idea that minors should be able to pursue 
their own interests and create a complete constraint on minors who do not 
receive consent from their legal guardians.351 The law also ignores the interests 
of third parties who would benefit by being able to rely on the enforceability of 
contracts with the minor.352 In turn, this may decrease the protection of 
commerce.353 A person will probably not contract with a minor without the 
consent of his parents, which may leave certain markets in commerce 
unfulfilled. On the other hand, if the person contracting with the minor does 
obtain parental consent, he can rely on the enforceability of the contract. 
In an attempt to promote commerce with minors and protect them from 
potential disadvantages, some countries enforce contracts that are beneficial 
for the minor. The common law rule in the United Kingdom is that contracts 
made with minors are binding if the contract benefits the minor overall.354 The 
 
 344 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 105–07, translated in RAYMOND YOUNGS, 
SOURCEBOOK ON GERMAN LAW 235–38 (Cavendish Publ’g Ltd. 2d ed. 2002) (1994) (containing the English 
translation). 
 345 HEIN KÖTZ & AXEL FLESSNER, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 101 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1992). 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id. at 102. 
 348 Id. 
 349 Id. at 101. 
 350 Id. 
 351 Id. at 102. 
 352 Id. 
 353 Id. at 101. 
 354 G.H. TREITEL, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 215 (Butterworths 5th ed. 1995) (1962). 
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court decides whether the contract is beneficial and may look at surrounding 
circumstances.355 These principles have been used to determine the validity of 
professional contracts entered into by minors who are athletes and 
entertainers.356 The rule that binds beneficial contracts with minors, however, 
creates problems because enforceability of the contracts is determined on a 
case-by-case basis. In turn, this may make agents wary of contracting with 
minor athletes. 
In 2006, the Chancery Division of Manchester heard a case regarding a 
young football player, Wayne Rooney, and his decision to rescind a 
representation agreement and enter into a new agreement.357 The court held 
that Rooney could break the contract with his original agent because it was not 
to his advantage taken as a whole.358 Rooney was already a “footballing 
phenomenon”359 and had contracted with a professional team, so he did not 
have a need for representation.360 Therefore, he could disaffirm his first 
representation contract and enter into a new one. The court implied, however, 
that Rooney could not disaffirm his contract with his current soccer team 
because it was for his benefit overall.361 
VI.  FIFA’S SOLUTION: 2009 REGULATIONS 
FIFA and UEFA are aware of the strategies that clubs use to circumvent the 
transfer regulations and recruit minors. UEFA President, Michel Platini, gave a 
speech to the European Parliament in which he raised the issue of exploiting 
child labor in football and stated that “[p]aying a child to kick a ball is not that 
different from paying a child to work on a production line.”362 He also 
addressed the problem of child trafficking.363 Accordingly, FIFA made many 
amendments to RSTP (2005) in 2009 that focus on the protection of minors.364 
 
 355 G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 503 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 10th ed. 1999) (1962). 
 356 Id. 
 357 Proform Sports Mgmt. Ltd. v. Proactive Sports Mgmt. Ltd. & Another, [2006] EWHC 2903 (Ch), 
[2007] Bus. L.R. 93. 
 358 Id. at 106. 
 359 Id. at 94. 
 360 Id. at 105. 
 361 Id. 
 362 UEFA President Urges Protection of Football’s Values, UEFA.COM (Feb. 22, 2009, 7:10 AM), 
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/organisation/president/news/newsid=801478.html. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Circular No. 1190: Revised Regulations on the Status of Transfers of Players–Protection of Minors, 
supra note 144. 
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This Part discusses these amendments and analyzes the potential problems of 
the new regulations. 
A. FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players (2009) 
In October 2009, FIFA implemented the newest Regulations for the Status 
and Transfer of Players. According to FIFA Circular No. 1190, the vast 
majority of the amendments “relate to the protection of minors as well as of the 
clubs investing in the training and education of young players.”365 RSTP 
(2009) defines a minor as “a player who has not yet reached the age of 18.”366 
Articles 19(1) and (2) of RSTP (2009) are the same as Articles 19(1) and (2) of 
RSTP (2005), generally prohibiting international transfers for players under the 
age of eighteen and including three exceptions.367 The regulations also now 
apply to “any player who has never been previously registered with a club and 
is not a national of the country in which he wishes to be registered for the first 
time.”368 More importantly, FIFA added Article 19(4), which requires the 
Players’ Status Committee369 to appoint a subcommittee to examine and 
approve or reject each international transfer of a minor player.370 The 
subcommittee also oversees every registration of a minor “who has never 
previously been registered with a club and is not a national of the country in 
which he wishes to be registered for the first time.”371 This review is limited to 
players between the ages of twelve and eighteen, however, because under 
Article 9(2) “an [International Transfer Certificate] is not required for a player 
under the age of 12.”372 
RSTP (2009) also added Article 19(bis), which covers the registration and 
reporting of minors at academies.373 Under this provision, “[c]lubs that operate 
 
 365 Id. 
 366 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 6. 
 367 Id. at 20; FIFA RSTP (2005), supra note 178, at 16. 
 368 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 20. 
 369 FIFA Players’ Status Committee, FRONTROW LEGAL, www.frontrowlegal.com/services/players-
coaches-and-managers/fifa-players-status-committee (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (“The FIFA Players’ Status 
Committee is a tribunal administrated from FIFA Headquarters in Zurich which, as the title suggests, 
adjudicates on the status of players. It follows a typical format similar to that of court proceedings where the 
parties have the right to be heard, the right to present evidence and the right to inspect evidence leading to a 
decision.”). 
 370 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, art. 19(4). 
 371 Id. at 20. 
 372 Id. at 19–20. 
 373 Id. at 21. Under RSTP (2009), academy means “an organisation or an independent legal entity whose 
primary, long-term objective is to provide players with long-term training through the provision of the 
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an academy with legal, financial or de facto links to the club are obliged to 
report all minors who attend the academy to the association upon whose 
territory the academy operates.”374 The national association must oversee all 
the academies that are not linked to a club and requires them to report all 
minors.375 Each association must also “keep a register comprising the names 
and dates of birth of the minors who have been reported to it by the clubs or 
academies.”376 
B. Problems with RSTP (2009) 
As of the writing of this Comment, it has yet to be shown whether these 
changes have been effective in protecting minors. Ideally, the new provisions 
covering the registration of minors in academies will prevent the trafficking of 
minors by monitoring each association’s register.377 Unfortunately, however, it 
seems as though it will be difficult to keep these lists accurate in African 
countries in the midst of the child trafficking problem due to the large amounts 
of unaccredited academies. In Ghana, approximately 500 illegal academies are 
operating in the city of Accra alone, and thousands more are spread across the 
country.378 Therefore, it is seemingly impossible for Ghana’s national 
association to meet its responsibility of keeping track of all the minors enrolled 
in the many unaccredited training academies. 
Another potential problem may evolve from the fact that the subcommittee 
is only responsible for overseeing the international movement of players 
between the age of twelve and eighteen.379 This creates a very real concern for 
children under the age of twelve. In September 2009, Barcelona utilized this 
loophole in the minor international transfer system when the club signed a 
seven-year-old French boy, enrolling him in its training academy.380 
Additionally, these rules only pertain to international transfers. Therefore, the 
 
necessary training facilities and infrastructure. This shall primarily include, but not be limited to, football 
training centres, football camps, football schools, etc.” Id. at 6. 
 374 Id. 
 375 Id. 
 376 Id. 
 377 See id. 
 378 Dan McDougall, The Scandal of Africa’s Trafficked Players, OBSERVER (London), Jan. 6, 2008, 
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 379 New Regulations for the International Transfer and First Registration of Players Under the Age of 18, 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE COUNTY FA (Nov. 16, 2009, 4:13 PM), http://www.gloucestershirefa.com/News/2009/11/ 
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 380 Brian Lofrumento, Barca Sign a 7 Year Old? You Must Be Joking, PREMIERSHIP TALK (Sept. 17, 
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trading and movement of young players between clubs within the same 
national association could still pose problems. For example, seven-year-old 
Harry Yates’s parents agreed to sign with Everton, an English club that had 
been competing with Manchester United and Liverpool to enroll the boy in its 
training academy.381 Furthermore, some national associations oversee more 
than one country. The Football Association is the national association that 
oversees Britain, Scotland, and Ireland,382 which means that players transferred 
between clubs in these three countries do not need an International Transfer 
Certificate, and therefore the new regulations do not apply to these transfers.383 
This creates a significant loophole for these three countries. 
VII.  SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
FIFA’s RSTP (2009) will hopefully help curb some of the European 
trading of minor football players, but there still seem to be enough loopholes 
for clubs to circumvent the rules. Furthermore, many of the problems fall 
outside of the scope of FIFA’s authority. Therefore, other organizations such 
as the EU institutions need to step in. A report by the Committee on Culture 
and Education noted the problems with trafficking in football in its 2006 
Report on the Future of Professional Football, and submitted a Motion for a 
European Parliament Resolution.384 Although the report provides support for 
the home-grown rule,385 the committee “is convinced that additional 
arrangements are necessary to ensure that the home-grown players initiative 
does not lead to child trafficking.”386 The report further “insists that 
immigration law must always be respected in relation to the recruitment of 
young foreign talent.” 387 Unfortunately, the report does not offer specific steps 
that the governing bodies of football or the EU should take to prevent the 
abuse of immigration laws in football.388 This Part first suggests changes that 
FIFA and UEFA should implement.389 Next, it suggests changes that the EU 
 
 381 Graham Fisher, Everton Sign 7 Year-Old Harry Yates—Is This Too Young?, SOCCERLENS (Mar. 26, 
2008), http://soccerlens.com/harry-yates-everton-sign-7-year-old-goalie/6792. 
 382 See New Regulations for the International Transfer and First Registration of Players Under the Age of 
18, supra note 379. 
 383 Id. 
 384 See Report on the Future of Professional Football in Europe, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 2006/2130(INI)) 
(2007). 
 385 Id. at 9. 
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 388 See id. 
 389 See infra Part VII.A. 
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institutions should enact.390 Finally, it discusses actions international 
organizations should take to help eliminate child trafficking in international 
football.391 
A. Solutions for Implementation by the Governing Bodies of Football 
1. Amendments to FIFA RSTP (2009) 
FIFA took a step in the right direction to help protect minors through the 
enactment of RSTP (2009). As of the writing of this Comment, however, it is 
still too early to know how great of an impact the new transfer regulations will 
have on minors. One potential problem is that these rules might unintentionally 
harm minors at an even younger age. For example, RSTP (2009) requires the 
Players’ Status Committee to appoint a subcommittee to review each 
International Transfer Certificate for transfers involving minors.392 Under 
Article 9(2) of RSTP (2009), however, players under the age of twelve do not 
need an International Transfer Certificate to transfer internationally.393 This 
leads to a fear that the clubs will start recruiting children who are eleven years 
old or younger because the subcommittee only reviews international transfer of 
minors between the age of twelve and eighteen.394 Reports suggest that two 
clubs have already enrolled seven-year-old boys in their youth training 
academies.395 Therefore, it would be in the best interest of the children if RSTP 
(2009) required the subcommittee to supervise all international transfers of 
minors regardless of whether the transfer requires an International Transfer 
Certificate. The subcommittee would then look at each case and ensure the 
transfer conforms to the FIFA regulations and is in the best interest of the 
child. 
2. Removal of the UEFA Home-Grown Rule and Allocation of Money to 
Youth Training Academies 
According to UEFA, the home-grown rule aims to encourage investment in 
youth training academies and re-nationalize and re-localize club teams.396 
 
 390 See infra Part VII.B. 
 391 See infra Part VII.C. 
 392 FIFA RSTP (2009), supra note 17, at 18. 
 393 Id. at 12. 
 394 See supra notes 371–72 and accompanying text. 
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 396 ARNAUT, supra note 37, at 115. 
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These goals, however, have not necessarily been achieved, and the rule likely 
violates fundamental rights under EU law.397 Therefore, UEFA should remove 
the home-grown rule. A more effective way to attain this goal without 
violating the free movement of workers would be to require clubs to invest a 
certain percentage of their revenues in local youth training academies. This 
would ensure that clubs spend at least a certain percentage of their money on 
local academies rather than spending the money on foreign players. In turn, 
clubs might be able to support more players at their training academies, which 
would create a larger pool of local talent. This would assist UEFA in achieving 
the re-nationalization of club teams. The main problem with this solution is 
that it is not viable for the small clubs. This can be resolved, however, by 
implementing Advocate General Lenz’s suggestion in Bosman: redistribution 
of wealth to poorer clubs from broadcasting money to prevent the wealthiest 
clubs from monopolizing the best players.398 Distributing a certain percentage 
of the broadcasting money to the poorer clubs’ training facilities would help 
solve this problem. 
In the United States, the National Football League (“NFL”) implements a 
revenue sharing system for its franchise teams.399 Revenues from broadcasting 
and merchandise sales are divided among teams, which provides protection for 
small market teams.400 Sharing of broadcasting revenues would take place on a 
smaller scale in European Football. Rather than distributing the UEFA 
broadcasting revenues to all the clubs, the money would only be distributed to 
clubs that fall below a certain revenue level. Furthermore, these clubs could 
only use the money to invest in their local youth training academies. If these 
smaller clubs could develop larger facilities then more players could attend, 
which would create a greater pool of potentially talented players. This 
assertion also applies to the big clubs that would be required to allocate a 
certain percentage of revenues to their local youth training academies. If a big 
club were required to invest in its local training academy, then it might focus 
more on the local youth, which would enable it to discover more local talent. 
FIFA also generates an exorbitant amount of money through the sale of 
broadcasting rights. FIFA received $2.7 billion solely for the television 
 
 397 See supra notes 331–39 and accompanying text. 
 398 See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz at I-4921, Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de 
Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5040. 
 399 MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE WINNERS: USING SPORTS AND CULTURAL CENTERS AS TOOLS 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 90 (2009). 
 400 Id. 
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broadcast rights to the 2010 World Cup.401 One would imagine that FIFA 
would distribute some of this money to support African youth training 
academies and raise awareness of trafficking in youth football. FIFA, however, 
dropped a potential campaign to raise awareness of the youth trafficking 
problem due to “budgetary constraints.”402 
B. Solutions for Implementation by the EU Institutions 
1. Control of Illegal Immigration and Standardized Athletic Visas for 
Third-Country Nationals 
In general, “[v]isas and border controls are . . . aimed at preventing 
irregular or undesired entry into the territory of Member States or intercepting 
irregular entry at the border.”403 As of the writing of this Comment, however, 
there is no uniform visa or external border control system in the EU. 
Accordingly, third-country nationals who want to come to Europe to play 
football will go through the EU member state with the least restrictive visa or 
work permit application.404 Once these players obtain the appropriate visa, they 
can get residence permits and even obtain citizenship through naturalization in 
certain member states.405 At this point, the person will have EU citizenship and 
receive the free movement protections granted to workers in the EU under 
Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.406 
Therefore, it seems that a unification of the visa application for athletes would 
be the best solution to regulate the entry of foreign players into Europe and 
help reduce illegal immigration of athletes. 
In the United States, for example, different categories of visas exist for 
beneficiaries seeking employment as an athlete. For example, a P visa is a 
temporary nonimmigrant visa for athletes.407 Under this visa there are four 
categories (P-1 to P-4), and one must meet different criteria for each 
 
 401 Alastair Barr, A Star Abroad Burns Out at Home, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2010, 7:59 PM), http://online. 
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 403 STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW 94 (2d. ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (2000). 
 404 See supra Part V.A.1. 
 405 EU Immigration Study, supra note 276, at 46. 
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category.408 The four categories include: an athlete who is a member of an 
entertainment group; an athlete who is part of an exchange program; an athlete 
participating in a culturally unique program; and a dependent or a spouse of an 
athlete.409 All applications for these permits are submitted to one office, the 
Vermont Service Center, which “has jurisdiction over all sports-related 
nonimmigrant visa applications in the United States.”410 
Adoption of a similar program in the EU would help solve many of the 
problems regarding the international transfer of athletes. Under this proposed 
solution, every third-country national seeking to play for a club within the EU 
would have to obtain an EU athletic visa. The EU should appoint one 
committee to receive and review all these applications under the same 
standards. Each member state, however, could still regulate its own visas and 
resident permits. Therefore, the EU athletic visa would not impede member 
states’ sovereignty. The EU athletic visa would simply be an additional entry 
requirement for every third-country national. UEFA would have to require 
each club to put a copy of every third-country national’s EU athletic visa on 
file with the governing national association if the club were located in a 
member state. This plan also is in accord with the EU’s desire to create a 
common immigration policy.411 
2. Standardization of Contract Law 
Another problem that has been presented for clubs within the EU is the lack 
of uniformity in contract law.412 No uniform contract law exists regarding the 
age of consent for a minor to enter into an enforceable contract. Accordingly, 
some national associations do not allow minors to sign professional contracts 
until the age of eighteen, while others allow minors to sign contracts at the age 
of sixteen.413 One way to solve this problem is to create an EU law that allows 
all minors to enter into enforceable contracts at the age of sixteen.414 
Theoretically, this would be a great way to solve the differences in member 
states’ contract laws. It is very difficult, however, to harmonize national law in 
 
 408 Id. § 9.1. 
 409 Id. 
 410 Reiss, supra note 288, at 7. 
 411 EU Immigration Study, supra note 276, at 19. 
 412 See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 413 See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text. 
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the manner, and harmonization depends largely on the cooperation of member 
states.415 
FIFA and UEFA regulations do not restrict the age a minor can sign a 
professional contract. Therefore, the national associations decide the 
appropriate age that minors are allowed to enter into a professional contract 
with a club. If a club believes it is disadvantaged because it is losing players 
who transfer to teams that can offer professional contracts, then it must voice 
its complaints to the governing national association. 
C. Solutions for Implementation by Independent and International 
Organizations 
Individuals who are aware of the problems of child trafficking in 
international football have also formed non-governmental organizations and 
independent groups to help raise awareness and combat abuses faced by 
minors. For example, Jean-Claude Mbvoumin started a French non-
governmental organization called Culture Foot Solidaire to help raise 
awareness and help young football players faced with trafficking and illegal 
agents.416 Culture Foot Solidaire most recently wrote an open letter to FIFA 
President, Sepp Blatter, in 2010 regarding “Combating the Traffic of Young 
African Footballers.”417 This letter discusses a prevention campaign to combat 
trafficking of young football players, which FIFA abandoned in 2009.418 The 
letter points out that “[i]f this campaign is not instituted we fear that after the 
2010 World Cup the traffic of young minors will not only be a long-term 
feature of the African sporting landscape but indeed it will become worse: it 
will be institutionalised.”419 
Others have worked to help abandoned players in Europe on a smaller 
scale. For example, individuals that have noticed young African players 
abandoned in the streets of Europe have started football teams to allow these 
children to play and hopefully give them a second chance to be seen by 
 
 415 CHRISTIAN TWIGG-FLESNER, THE EUROPEANISATION OF CONTRACT LAW 42 (2008). 
 416 Culture Foot Solidaire Protecting Youth, FIFA.COM (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/ 
worldwideprograms/news/newsid=920094.html. 
 417 Matt Scott, FIFA “Abandons” Child Trafficking Campaign, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 4, 2010, 12:10 
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2010/feb/04/fifa-child-trafficking-sepp-blatter. 
 418 Id. 
 419 Id. 
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European clubs.420 In Greece, two former football managers started an amateur 
team, the Black Diamonds, after they noticed stranded African players 
wandering in the streets.421 The managers organize exhibition games with 
professional teams to help showcase the players to professional clubs.422 
South Africa hosted the 2010 World Cup, which was a significant step to 
increasing recognition of African football. People all over the world watched, 
which opened a great opportunity to raise awareness of the unlicensed agents 
throughout Africa. Hopefully, awareness campaigns will make African 
families think twice about sending their children to Europe with these agents. 
On a more pessimistic note, however, the 2010 World Cup might have also 
given young African boys unrealistic dreams of becoming a star footballer, 
which would allow false agents more opportunities to swoop in and illegally 
bring them to Europe from Africa. Therefore, as Mbvoumin pointed out in his 
letter to FIFA, it is crucial to start awareness campaigns in Africa as soon as 
possible.423 
CONCLUSION 
The Bosman case, the subsequent FIFA transfer regulations, and the 
amendments made to the transfer regulations over time have played a major 
role in forming the sport of football as the world knows it today. These transfer 
regulations, however, have had many negative effects on minors and the 
problems have been difficult to fix due to certain conflicts of laws. Fortunately, 
FIFA, UEFA, the EU, and other international organizations have begun to 
acknowledge these problems and have started to take action. The best results 
will be achieved if these organizations can collaborate to enact the solutions 
discussed in Part IV. UEFA should take the first additional step towards 
protecting minors by removing the home-grown rule. In turn, this will 
hopefully eliminate the motivation behind clubs seeking young foreign players 
to fulfill the home-grown quota. Additionally, raising awareness regarding the 
trafficking of minors would decrease fake agents’ ability to deceive young 
African boys and their families. The greater the collaboration between the 
relevant governing bodies and organizations involved with European football, 
 
 420 Christos Gavalas, Anything to Score, NYU LIVEWIRE (Mar. 7, 2007), http://journalism.nyu.edu/ 
publishing/archives/livewire/sports/ghana_soccer/index.html. 
 421 Id. 
 422 Id. 
 423 See supra notes 417–19 and accompanying text. 
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the greater the chance that the problems relating to the transfer of minors in 
international football will be solved. 
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